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AFTER THE BOMBINGS IN MADRID on March 11, 2004, presented 
in the press as “Europe’s September 11th,” U.S. and EU 
leaders will intensify cooperation in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs. Yet, in other policy sectors, the EU and the U.S. 
publicly voice their differences. The declarations of the next 
head of government, the Socialist José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, 
regarding Spanish troops in Iraq suggest that the “pro-Bush” 
coalition in the EU is about to change. A year after the beginning 
of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the intra-EU and transatlantic 
tensions that resulted from the build-up to the war, it is time to 
assess the state of EU-U.S. relations. Two of the contributions 
to this Forum on transatlantic relations are adapted from talks 
delivered by board members John Keeler and Sophie Meunier at 
the workshop that EUSA and Sciences Po organized in Paris in 
November 2003. They respectively focus on defense and trade 
issues. They make us understand that the lines of cleavage are not 
the ones that receive the most media and popular attention and 
that we should rethink the way we rank the intensity of disputes 
and explain them. We conclude with an area where cooperation 
is both new and successful: border controls.
—Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor
Transatlantic Trade Issues
Sophie Meunier
IN THE GOOD OLD DAYS of pre-Iraq transatlantic unison, it was trade 
disputes between the European Union and the United States 
over issues such as beef and bananas which made headlines. 
Fast-forward a few years later: Most of these disputes still exist, 
and new ones have emerged, but they may now seem minute 
in the broader framework of bilateral discord. Indeed, transat-
lantic commercial relations are revealing two regions deeply 
intertwined. The EU and the U.S., the world’s largest players 
in global trade, are each other’s main trading partners, account-
ing for around one fi  fth of each other’s bilateral trade (about 
euros 1 billion a day). These extremely signifi  cant trade fl  ows 
are supplemented by an even bigger investment relationship, as 
each region holds major stakes in the other’s market. The EU 
is the host for 53% (726 billion) of all U.S. direct investment 
abroad and contributes 72% ($947 billion) of all foreign direct 
investment in the U.S.. As a result, about one third of transat-
lantic trade is conducted between U.S. or European parent fi  rms 
and their subsidiaries.1  Yet new challenges are now facing the 
transatlantic trade relationship. From bilateral disputes with in-
creasingly higher stakes, to the collapse of the Cancun meeting 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the enlargement of 
the European Union, and the EU institutional reform, let alone 
a divergence of visions on how the international system should 
be managed and the negative pull of domestic politics, the EU 
and the U.S. have many problematic issues with which to deal 
simultaneously. 
Bilateral EU-U.S. Trade Disputes Bilateral EU-U.S. Trade Disputes
Ask any American or European offi  cial about the state 
of the Transatlantic trade relationship, and they will always 
start with a reassuring claim that 98% of the trade that occur 
between them is absolutely fi  ne. As Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade 
com  mis  sion  er, puts it: “If you look from the moon, things don’t 
look so bad.”2  And it is true that even in a tensed geopolitical 
en  vi  ron  ment, for European and American traders and investors, 
it is business as usual. During the fi  rst half of 2003, in spite of 
the Transatlantic rift over Iraq, U.S. corporations invested $40 
bil  lion into Europe, a 15% increase from 2002, and European 
com  pa  nies invested $36 billion into the U.S. Moreover, when 
fric  tions arise, they can now be mediated and solved within the 
frame  work of the World Trade Organization dispute settlement 
pro  ce  dure. Indeed, of the fi  fty-four completed WTO cases that 
went to dispute settlement panels from 1995 to 2001, sixteen 
were EU-U.S. disputes. Several of the famous bilateral disputes 
have been settled recently—such as bananas, beef hormones, 
and even steel. Other ongoing EU-U.S. disputes are far from 
being re  solved, however, especially when they result not from 
sheer pro  tec  tion  ism but from regulatory differences.
      Tax breaks: In 2000 the EU asked the WTO to adjudicate 
on the so-called Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) dispute—an 
American law taxing exports more favorably than production 
abroad. In subsequent rulings, the WTO confi  rmed that the FSC 
indeed constituted an illegal export subsidy and authorized the 
EU to impose $4 billion in retaliatory sanctions if the U.S. law 
was not brought in compliance with WTO obligations. In March 
2004, the Europeans decided to phase in the retaliatory mea-
sures, which will hit a wide range of goods, including textiles, 
jewelry and toys, until Congress repeals the trade-distorting 
regulations. 
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      Anti-Dumping: Anti-Dumping: In 2000 the WTO condemned the U.S. 1916 
Anti-Dumping Act for allowing sanctions against dumping not 
permitted under WTO agreements and gave the U.S. one year 
to repeal the Act. Since the matter was originally brought to the 
WTO in 1998, the U.S. brought four new complaints against 
EU companies on anti-dumping grounds. In February 2004, 
given the non-compliance of the U.S., the WTO allowed the 
EU to retaliate by implementing a mirror regulation that would 
be applicable to American products.
       Genetically modifi  ed organisms Genetically modifi  ed organisms: Since 1998, the EU has 
observed a moratorium on the approval of GMO products, and 
some member states banned the import and cultivation of some 
crops that had been approved prior to that date. The EU made 
this decision in response to popular concern about the long-term 
impact of GMOs on human health and the environment, although 
there was little scientifi  c evidence to support these concerns, but 
no evidence either that GMOs are harmless. In May 2003, the 
Bush administration decided to fi  nally fi  le the suit against the 
EU at the WTO.
The Doha Round 
      Transatlantic trade relations are also being challenged by 
the current state of the WTO multilateral negotiating process. 
The “Doha development agenda”, as the current round of trade 
talks is formally called, is about negotiating away trade barri-
ers with the goal of improving general economic welfare, in 
particular for the developing countries. Agriculture is the key 
variable in this round, with developed countries being asked 
to reduce (if not eliminate) their trade-distorting subsidies for 
farmers and the tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff barriers that they 
use to protect their domestic agriculture. Among the other cen-
tral issues are the so-called “Singapore issues” pushed by the 
EU—investment, competition policy, government procurement, 
and trade facilitation. By August 2003, the EU and the U.S. had 
reached a common proposal on reform of the protection of their 
agriculture. This was not enough, however. The collapse of the 
WTO Cancun meeting in September 2003 was due mainly to 
differences over agricultural reform, especially over the issue 
of cotton, between the U.S., the EU and a group of developing 
countries led by Brazil and India (called the G-22). The abrupt 
end of the meeting left great uncertainty concerning how to 
proceed with talks on agriculture, industrial goods, and the Sin-
gapore issues, especially during an electoral year in the U.S.
EU Enlargement EU Enlargement
      The EU will enlarge to ten new countries in May 2004. 
They will increase the size of the single market, augment the 
geographical size of the EU by 34%, and boost the total popu-
lation by 105 million to a total of $450 million. Structurally, 
enlargement will make the EU stronger in relation to its trade 
negotiating partners, because a larger single market is both 
more attractive to outside economic players and the threat of 
being cut out more costly. By joining the EU, however, the 
new entrants are bringing in a wealth of different histories and 
cultures, which also means different interests and sensibilities. 
These will have to be included and amalgamated in the defi  ni-
tion of a common European position on trade. Diversity could 
incapacitate the EU’s ability to make decisions and bog down 
multilateral trade liberalization. It could also lead to common 
positions which are invariably the lowest common denominator 
and, therefore, to a protectionist bias of the EU in international 
trade negotiations. The EU enlargement also poses legal issues 
for the Transatlantic trade relationship. For instance, the U.S. 
and the new entrants have bilateral agreements on investment 
protection that do include provisions contrary to Community 
law (for instance with respect to investments in the audiovi-
sual sector). Another problem results from the extension of the 
customs union to ten currently autonomous territories. In most 
cases, third countries will benefi  t from a drop in custom duties. 
In some highly visible cases, however, such as banana imports, 
the current custom duties of the new entrants are lower than 
those of the EU–which presumably will lead to trade frictions, 
in particular with the United States.
The EU Constitution
       During the European Convention, many voices demanded 
a greater role for the European Parliament in trade policy, since 
trade now covers politically sensitive issues that used to be the 
exclusive domain of domestic regulation, such as food safety and 
culture. In response, the Convention introduced many impor-
tant institutional changes with respect to trade policy. First, the 
Constitution project opens up great avenues for parliamentary 
control. Trade-related legislation, such as antidumping rules, 
will now be adopted according to the co-decision procedure 
–that is, jointly by the Council and the Parliament. The second 
institutional problem currently faced by the EU is how to keep 
an effi  cient decision-making system in an enlarged Europe of 
25 or even 30 member states. The proposed Constitution sim-
plifi  es the complex policy-making apparatus in trade, clarifi  es 
that trade policy is an exclusive Community competence, and 
broadens the use of qualifi  ed majority voting.
       Overall, the transatlantic trade relationship is based on 
mutual commercial interests that serve as an anchor of stability 
in the world. For a long time, the EU and the U.S. were almost 
the only players in the multilateral negotiating system–or at least 
they were the ones who called all the shots. The Doha round 
shows that they now share the leadership, but that they cannot 
ignore the other players. On most trade issues, the U.S. and the 
EU have interests closer to each other than they do with the 
rest of the world. The escalation of transatlantic trade disputes, 
and in particular the imposition of retaliation measures, should 
therefore be undertaken with extreme political caution. Still, the 
U.S. and the EU should also play according to the rules of the 
game, whether in steel or in agriculture. Europe and America 
realize that they are benefi  ting immensely from globalization, 
yet there is a need for rules to manage this globalization.
Sophie Meunier is research associate in public and interna-
tional affairs at the Princeton Institute for International and 
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Transatlantic Relations and European Security and 
Defense
John T. S. Keeler
IMPLAUSIBLE THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE seemed when the EU’s two 
leading military powers—the United Kingdom and France—
were bitterly divided over the issue of launching war against 
Iraq, it is now possible that 2003 will eventually be viewed 
mainly as a year of pivotal progress in the development of 
the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).3 
Indeed, it has been argued that “2003 may yet go down in the 
annals as the year when the European Union fi  nally came of 
age as an international actor.”4  Grudging validation of this as-
sessment may be found in the comments of offi  cials across 
the Atlantic. “There are few topics that unsettle the Pentagon 
more,” one journalist recently wrote in early 2004, “than the 
creeping advance of the separate defense and security identity 
of the European Union countries.”5  
In what ways has ESDP advanced over the last year? How 
has progress been possible in the wake of the Franco-Brit  ish 
confrontation over Iraq? And why has the United States grown 
concerned about the evolution of ESDP? The rest of this essay 
will briefl  y answer each of these key questions.
The Progress of ESDP: From Institution-Building to Action The Progress of ESDP: From Institution-Building to Action
The recent rapid succession of ESDP developments began 
on December 16, 2002, when the EU and NATO issued an im-
  por  tant joint Declaration on the European Security and Defense 
Policy. The culmination of more than six years of ne  go  ti  a  tion, 
this agreement provided a framework for EU-NATO co  op  er  a  tion 
and, most importantly, provided the EU with “as  sured ac  cess” 
to NATO’s planning facilities for the conduct of EU-led crisis 
management operations.6  
Two weeks later, on January 1, 2003, commenced the 
fi  rst EU-led civilian crisis management mission, the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The EUPM followed on from a UN International Police Task 
Force and con  sists of approximately 500 police offi  cers from 
all 15 EU mem  ber states and 18 other countries. The EUPM 
functions with a 3-year mandate and is supervised by an EU 
Special Rep  re  sen  ta  tive who reports to the Council through the 
High Rep  re  sen  ta  tive for CFSP.7 
In March 2003 the EU initiated the fi  rst Union-led mil  i  tary 
operation, Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Re  pub  lic 
of Macedonia. Following on a NATO Operation, Concordia in-
volved 400 military personnel (from 13 EU mem  ber states and 
14 non-EU countries) and lasted for 8.5 months. In line with 
the EU-NATO agreement of 2002, this operation was the fi  rst 
to make use of SHAPE planning and command capabilities and 
was commanded by Admiral Rainer Feist (Ger  ma  ny), NATO’s 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).8 
In June 2003, responding to a call from the UN Sec  re  tary 
General for an interim emergency multinational force to bring 
stability to Bunia in the Congo, the EU launched Op  er  a  tion Ar-
temis, its fi  rst autonomous military operation and the fi  rst ESDP 
operation to be deployed outside of Europe. Artemis last  ed less 
than three months, but it accomplished its goal—paving the 
way for a UN mission in Bunia—and served as a successful 
test of the EU Framework Nation concept adopted in July 2002. 
France served as the framework nation in this case, providing 
the command and control capabilities for the mission as well as 
the majority of the 1400 personnel; a total of fi  ve EU member 
states and four non-member states contributed personnel to the 
operation.9 
In December 2003, with the completion of Operation Con-
cordia, the EU made the transition to a Police Mission—code-
named PROXIMA—in the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia. This mission was slated to last for a year and to involve 
200 personnel form EU member states and other coun  tries.10
Modest though the four ESDP operations of 2003 were in 
some respects, together they represented a major step toward 
establishing the EU as a military actor on the world stage. The 
EU’s seriousness of purpose in this realm was underscored by 
the publication in June 2003 of the Union’s fi  rst security strat  e  gy 
report, A Secure Europe in a Better World, which portrayed the 
EU as a “global actor…ready to share in the responsibility for 
global security.”11  A similar signal was sent by the com  ple  tion, 
in November 2003, of the fi  rst ever joint EU-NATO crisis man-
agement exercise, CME/CMX 03.12
Despite the many advances noted above, the Achilles heel 
of ESDP remains the limited resources at its disposal. While 
progress was noted at the May 2003 Capabilities Conference, 
some analysts argue that EU member states have failed to meet 
the targets of the Helsinki Headline Goal and few expect that 
the EU will have the capacity to engage on high-end military 
operations before 2010.13
Intra-European and Transatlantic Tensions over ESDP Intra-European and Transatlantic Tensions over ESDP
Skeptics have long argued that the fundamental po  lit  i  cal 
vulnerability of ESDP is the fact that, even after St. Malo, the 
British vision remains far more Atlanticist or less au  ton  o  mous 
than the French vision.14  A vivid illustration of this prob  lem 
was provided on April 29, 2003 when the prime ministers 
of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg announced an 
agree  ment to enhance their collaboration on defense and jointly 
pro  posed the establishment of an EU operational planning cell 
(as an alternative to the NATO facility) in the Brussels suburb 
of Tervuren. The idea made considerable sense in technical 
terms and had been discussed as a possibility for several years, 
but as Charles Grant has argued, “given the context in which 
the ini  tia  tive was launched—with Europe split into two hostile 
camps—the timing was unbelievably foolish.” Given that the 
four gov  ern  ments involved were the leaders of the anti-war camp 
and had also blocked NATO aid for Turkey before the war, it 
was inevitable that the proposal would appear to be an effort 
to un  der  mine NATO. The British and American reactions were 
both understandably hostile.15
On this issue as on others before, however, ESDP proved 
more resilient than the skeptics lead one to expect. With the 
pas  sage of time came a growing recognition of the need for 
com  pro  mise by all concerned. The Tervuren plan was aban-
doned by its proponents, while the Blair government accepted 
the notion that the EU needed to enhance its operational plan-
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jointly proposed the establishment of an EU planning cell within 
SHAPE, NATO’s military headquarters near Mons, as well as 
the addition of a small unit of planners to the EU military staff 
in Brussels to allow for coordination of military missions run by 
French, Brit  ish or German national headquarters when NATO 
is not in  volved; NATO liaison offi  cers were to be based at the 
EU to further mitigate Atlanticist concerns.
While resolving the Tervuren controversy, the British, 
French and Germans also agreed to a compromise regarding 
two key defense-related items in the EU’s draft constitution. 
First, the section on “structured co-operation” would be revised 
so as to require unanimity for the establishment of what has 
been termed an “avant-garde group” for European defense. 
Second, the sec  tion on mutual military assistance would be 
revised to ac  knowl  edge that NATO will continue as the means 
for col  lec  tive de  fense.
Even with these compromises, as noted at the outset, ESDP 
has become an increasingly contentious issue in trans  at  lan  tic 
relations. “That is the consequence,” notes Charles Grant, “of 
the Francophobia that is particularly strong in the Pentagon, 
where European defense is seen—wrongly—as a French in-
  ven  tion.”16  It remains to be seen whether this perspective would 
change substantially with the defeat of George W. Bush in the 
2004 presidential election. However, it is clear that American 
offi  cials need to recognize that public support for ESDP is broad 
within the EU and that it seems to have been enhanced by the 
confrontation over the Iraq War. A survey conducted March 
10-17, 2003, demonstrated that U.S. and European citizens di-
  verged enormously on the question of whether U.S.-European 
dip  lo  mat  ic and security ties should remain close: 62% of U.S. 
cit  i  zens said yes, but this view was held by only 40% of British, 
30% of French, 33% of Germans, 30% of Italians and 24% of 
Spanish. A plurality (48%) in Britain and a majority in every 
case on the Continent (France 67%, Germany 60%, Italy 63% 
and Spain 60%) stated that their countries should strive to be 
“more independent” of the U.S. rather than remaining as close 
as in year’s past.17
John T. S. Keeler is professor of political science and director 
of the European Union Center at the University of Washing-
ton in Seattle.
Transatlantic Cooperation in the Area of  Border Con-
trol
Virginie Guiraudon 
AFTER THE BOMBINGS of the World Trade Center, bureaucrats re-
  spon  si  ble for “Justice and Home Affairs” in the EU and “home-
  land security” in the US soon met. On 26 October 2001, at a 
closed meeting of the EU Strategic Committee on Im  mi  gra  tion, 
Frontiers and Asylum, the head of the US delegation informed 
EU member state offi  cials that “since the events of 11 Sep  tem  ber 
2001, the whole system of visas, border control, man  age  ment 
of legal migration, etc. had come under close scrutiny and there 
was a consensus in the US on the need for a more effective sys-
tem across the board, not targeted spe  cifi      cal  ly at terrorism but 
taking the events of 11 September as the trigger for de  vel  op  ing 
a new approach.”18
      The U.S. policy changes in the area of border controls di-
  rect  ly concerned EU-based companies, EU cit  i  zens and EU laws. 
Fol  low  ing the November 2001 US Trans  por  ta  tion Se  cu  ri  ty Act, 
air  line companies have been asked to pro  vide US au  thor  i  ties 
with extensive information on passengers fl  ying to the U.S., per-
sonal data known as PNR (passenger name record). Moreover, 
to al  low EU citizens to travel to the U.S. un  der the visa waiver 
pro  gram, a reform is under way, since all EU passports must 
be machine-readable and integrate biometric iden  ti  fi    ers such as 
fi  n  ger  prints and iris scans.19  The 26 October 2003 deadline has 
been postponed for a year.
Both the Council of Ministers and the European Commission 
have tried to cooperate in a diligent man  ner with U.S. authorities. 
U.S. tactics have been heavy-handed at times. Given the state 
of the transport industry after 9/11 and the beginning of the 
economic slump, EU leaders could not ignore U.S. threats to 
refuse landing rights to airlines. Whereas trans  at  lan  tic trade 
disputes continued and tensions grew over the build-up to the war 
in Iraq, there was a clear political will of the EU Commission and 
Council to comply with US demands  that af  fect  ed the movement 
of people between the EU and the US.
Antiterrorism justifi  ed the fact that measures be adopted 
quickly without taking into account the opinion of the relevant 
interest groups, non-governmental associations, and experts, 
respectively airlines, civil liberties groups, and computer 
security analysts. More importantly, the sense of urgency 
after 9/11 and the rapid passing of new US legislation that 
included “exceptional” measures led the EU offi  cials in charge 
of responding to U.S. pressures to ignore “normal” procedures 
and the EU legal framework. 
The U.S.-EU agreement on the transfer of PNR data by air 
carriers to U.S. authorities is a case in point. Several points stand 
in contradistinction with the 1995 EU data protection directive: 
(1) the number and type of data that U.S. authorities have direct 
access to, (2) the purposes for which the data might be used, 
(3) the type and number of agencies that can access the data, 
and (4) the lack of redress mechanism for people denied entry 
to the U.S. In February 2003, the Director General for External 
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Brussels and issued a joint statement on reconciling the new 
PNR transmission requirements of the 2001 U.S. Transportation 
Security Act with the requirements of EU data protection law. 
The statement ignored the October 2002 opinion of the Article 
29 data protection Working Party, the independent advisory 
body that gives opinions inter alia on EU data transfer to third 
parties, whose chair alerted the European Parliament Committee 
on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights. The European Commission 
agreed to cooperate with U.S. customs and told airlines to meet 
the March 2003 deadline fi  xed by U.S. authorities whereby they 
have had direct access to EU airline reservation databases to 
download personal data on all passengers and crew. 
Since then, the EP has acted as a watchdog and no less than 
three resolutions have been adopted in plenary to invite the 
Commission to take action so as to ensure adequate protection 
for personal data.20 The Commission negotiators tried to 
convince their U.S. counterparts to take into account privacy 
issues and obtained some minor compromises. Yet, they also 
agreed that EU passenger data could be used to test a new 
security profi  ling system known as CAPPS II, whereby each 
passenger is associated with a color-coded tag indicating his risk 
level. Members of the EP have also criticized the Commission’s 
legal solution: a Commission Decision “accompanied by a 
‘light’ international bilateral agreement.”21  U.S. Customs 
and the Department of Homeland Security have written out 
“undertakings” spelling out their intentions regarding PNR data 
yet this is very different from a Treaty approved by the U.S. 
Senate, if only in terms of legal redress for individuals. The 
tension in the area of transport security has been between the 
Commission and the Parliament – an inter-institutional rather 
than a transatlantic battle.
The Commission and the Council have expressed divergence 
in only one instance, which regards goods rather than persons. The 
European Commission has launched infringement procedures 
against Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium because 
they have signed individual bilateral agreements giving U.S. 
Customs agents powers to search all containers leaving EU 
ports for the USA under its January 2002 Container Security 
Initiative (CSI). The goal of the CSI is to prevent terrorists 
from using global containerized cargo. The U.S. has concluded 
bilateral arrangements with eight EU Member States without 
taking notice of Community competence. The Commission has 
argued that this bilateral approach is likely to create competitive 
distortions between EU ports. There has been no dissensions 
on the content of this cooperation, only on its form. In July 
2003, the Commission adopted a Communication on the role 
of customs calling for reinforced security checks, including for 
goods leaving the European Union. On 18 November 2003, the 
Commission Director General for Taxation and Customs Union 
and the U.S. Ambassador to the EU initialled an agreement to 
include transport security co-operation within the scope of the 
1997 EU/U.S. customs agreement so as to equalize EU and U.S. 
levels and standards of control.
What can we learn from the study of post 9/11 transatlantic 
relations in the area of homeland security? First, they tell 
us about the U.S. diplomatic strategy to gain leverage in 
negotiations with the EU. U.S. diplomats used “divide and 
conquer” tactics by seeking bilateral agreements with member 
states. Confronted with the fait accompli EU negotiators started  fait accompli EU negotiators started  fait accompli
talks at a severe disadvantage. U.S. diplomats also knew exactly 
how to exploit the EU inter-institutional dynamics. Commission 
offi  cials eager to fi  nd a EU-level agreement with the U.S. so as 
not to let member states act bilaterally sought to bypass legal 
procedures and parliamentary control. In March 2004, the EP 
Citizens’ Rights Committee met with Stewart Verdery, assistant 
secretary at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and lead 
negotiator for the U.S.-EU agreement on passenger data. He 
said that “air carriers were already transferring personal data 
. . .[and] Parliament would be well advised to prefer the draft 
agreement the U.S. and the Commission had reached to no 
agreement at all.”22  He knew that the EP opinion or potential 
appeal to the ECJ could not threaten the agreement. 
U.S. post 9/11 demands have justifi  ed and accelerated 
measures to reinforce EU border controls. U.S. laws have also 
served as a model for EU legislative proposals. In January 
2004, Spain put forward a proposal for an EC Council 
directive requiring carriers to collect and communicate data 
on passengers travelling to the EU at the time of boarding to 
the law enforcement authorities of the destination country. 
The directive to be accepted before June 2004 resembles U.S. 
regulations, except that Spain stated that the measures were 
aimed at fi  ghting illegal immigration not terrorism. 
      This does not mean that terrorist attacks cannot accelerate 
the adoption of decisions affecting border control. After March 
11 and the attacks on suburban trains in Madrid, the special 
European Council that met in Brussels issued a Declaration 
on Combating Terrorism. The statement urged the prompt 
adoption of the Spanish initiative regarding passenger data 
and the Commission proposal to upgrade EU passports and 
visas. There is also now a commitment to early approval of 
the EU-U.S. agreement on airline passenger data. The Council 
declaration pledges to “further strengthen cooperation with the 
U.S. and other partners” and a key objective is to “develop 
further EU transport security standards in coordination with 
relevant third countries.”23  After September 11, 2001, U.S. 
demands have justifi  ed EU reforms. March 11, 2004 in turn 
will hasten the adoption of the measures that the U.S. executive 
has been asking for.
Virginie Guiraudon is research Fellow at the National Center 
for Scientifi  c Research in Lille, France.6     Spring  2004   EUSA Review
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